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ABSTRACT  
This article engages critically with the International Governmentality Studies, delineating a new use 
of Foucault’s toolbox applied to analyse the New Economic Governance (NEG) reforms. The 
main argument is that the NEG is a reaffirmation and a reinforcement of the fiscal governance 
machine established with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The fiscal governance machine is 
an ensemble of techniques shaped by and through which the European art of government is able to 
work in the entire European space. The article analyses how the Treaty on Stability Coordination 
and Governance reaffirms this fiscal governance machine. By looking at three techniques – the 
structural deficit, the Fiscal Council, and the Automatic Mechanism – it shows some key features 
of this fiscal governance machine: a new discretional power in the hand of the European Commis-
sion and of its DG Finance, a decentralised and semi-automatic form of control on Member 
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1. Introduction  
In the last decades, International Governmentality Studies (IGS) have been 
the best tool to analyse reforms, programmes, or plans of the new emergent global 
institutions (Walters 2012). In fact, researchers deploying a governmentality ap-
proach have been very effective in exposing the ‘taken for granted’ of the emerging 
global governance (Walters 2004; Shore 2011; Isleyen 2014; Zanotti 2016). Howev-
er, the continuous emphasis on multiplicity as much as a passive understanding of 
actors – being institutions or states – only able to perform in their daily routines 
ideas and discourses shaped elsewhere, has put the IGS in a conundrum, where they 
have been unable – and not interested – to analyse the economic and financial crisis 
and the European institutional answer to it.  
From the one hand, this article will constructively engage with the IGS 
concerned with European integration criticising them on three points: their focus 
on the plurality of powers and resistances, but not on their articulation (Mezzadra & 
Neilson 2013); the interest on plans and reforms, but not on their application 
(Lemke 2007); and the specific relations between knowledge and power, but not on 
the broader socio-economic context (Jessop 2010). On the other hand, it will delin-
eate a new use of Foucault’s toolbox to be applied in the analysis of the New Eco-
nomic Governance (NEG).1  
 
1 In this article when we talk about New Economic Governance we refer to the Six-Pack, composed 
by: Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coor-
dination of economic policies; Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure; Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 
16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Council 
Directive (EU) No 85/2011 of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the 
Member States; and the so-called Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, namely Regulation (EU) 
No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforce-
ment measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the Euro area. The Two-Pack, 
composed by: Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 
May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area; Council Regulation (EU) 
No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability. The European Semester codified in 
the Regulation No 1175/2011 (EU), part of the Six Pack. And The Treaty on Stability Coordination 






Our analysis starts from the idea that in the European Union the liberal art 
of government has been reformulated in a specific combination of ordolibearalism 
and neoliberalism, an ordo/neoliberal art of government. This art of government 
works through different techniques, some of which are composed and stabilised in 
governance machines. The fiscal governance machine has governed the European 
economic governance making fiscal prudence the only acceptable economic dis-
course. Therefore, our main argument is that NEG is a reaffirmation and a rein-
forcement of this fiscal governance machine, initially set up with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP).  
The argumentation of the article is developed in three steps: first we intro-
duce how governmentality has been used in International Relations and European 
Studies. Second, we delineate how the ordo/neoliberal art of government works in 
the European space. Third, we explore how the fiscal governance machine has been 
reaffirmed in the NEG, looking specifically at three techniques: the structural defi-
cit, the Fiscal Council, and the Automatic Mechanism. Through their analysis we are 
able to show some key features of the reaffirmation of the fiscal governance ma-
chine: a new discretional power in the hand of the European Commission and of its 
DG Finance, a decentralised and semi-automatic form of control on Member states, 
the structuration of a euro-national ensemble of executives and finance institutions 
kept together by an ordo/neoliberal discourse.  
 
2. Governmentality in European Studies  
Since the ending of the Cold War, International Relations (IR) has been 
forced to open its debate between Realism and Liberalism to a new set of questions 
and points of view. Traditional IR was questioned by new emerging critical ap-
proaches more able to analyse the global situation and the new emerging global 
challenges (Dunne et al. 2013). The same capacity to open up the traditional debate 
did not occur in European Studies, where Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmen-
 
and Governance entered into force the 1st January 2013, and signed as an international treaty and not 
part of the EU legal framework. 





talism are still dominating the discipline, with their binary division between national 
and supranational, intergovernmental or supranational, economic or political inte-
gration (Manners & Whitman 2016).   
Mainstream European Studies takes for granted its field of research, un-
derstanding itself as objective, apolitical and rational discipline. The different main-
stream approaches – even if in different ways – share an ahistorical view on the 
human nature, which is considered rational, individualistic and utilitarian. This is 
what Ryner (2012, p. 649) defines an instrumental reason, based on ceteris paribus as-
sumptions, which leads to analyses that “isolate and treat all but selected dependent 
and independent variables as constant” (Cafruny & Ryner 2003, p. 33). Neverthe-
less, even during the crisis, Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism remained 
the alpha and the omega to refer to (Fabbrini 2013; Vilpišauskas 2013; Bickerton et 
al. 2015; Niemann & Ioannou 2015; Schimmelfennig 2015; Caporaso & Rhodes 
2016). 
In these years, scholars inspired by Foucault – in many different ways – 
have called into question this mainstream debate highlighting how theories are not 
objective. On the contrary, theories have the capacity to inform their field of analy-
sis through their conceptualization, in this way, they have used Foucault to reveal 
the connection between the production of knowledge and the question of power, 
exposing the non-neutrality of the researcher’s position (Diez 2008). From this 
stance, European Studies does not merely describe the European system, but it ac-
tively contributes to the construction of the system. Hence, the mainstream debate 
is shaping a ‘disciplinary orthodoxy’ which is producing and constraining the Euro-
pean space (Selby 2007, p. 327).  
In the ’90s, Foucault was mainly applied to study the transformations of 
social programmes at the national level: the shift from regimes of welfare to regimes 
of workfare; from vertical judgement to peer evaluation; from authoritative deci-
sion-making to good practices (Burchell et al. 1991; Barry et al. 1996; Cruikshank 
1999; Rose 1999; Miller & Rose 2008). In the English-speaking countries, these 
studies flourished after the publication of the The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmen-






tality by Burchell, Gordon and Miller (1991),2 and they proved to be very effective in 
analysing the neoliberal turn of welfare institutions. 
Since the early 2000s, Foucault has entered into IR discipline opening the 
discipline to a new set of reflections and debate.3 There is a very heterogeneous use 
of Foucault both in IR and European Studies. Selby (2007) proposes to divide this 
heterogeneous body of works in three different groups: first, works who have used 
Foucault to criticise the realist debate (Shapiro & Alker 1996; Rosenow 2009; Walk-
er 2009); second, works who have used Foucault with the empirical purpose to 
bringing to the fore the discourses, practices and techniques of the new emergent 
neoliberal governance (Huysmans 2004; Zanotti 2013; Isleyen 2014); third, works 
who have used Foucault as a basis for a new broad analysis of the contemporary 
global order (Hardt & Negri 2001, 2006, 2011, 2017).  
The first and second group of works can be labelled under what Walters 
(2012) calls ‘International Governmentality Studies’ (IGS), a constellation of works 
who have used governmentality as a form of political analysis for international rela-
tions. This constellation, contrary to what is generally thought, does not use Fou-
cault as a postmodernist author who privileges discourse over materiality, but on 
the contrary, it applies governmentality as a tool to study the relation between 
knowledge and power in international politics as an empiric site of analysis (Walters 
2012, p. 88). In this article, we will take into consideration only those International 
Governmentality Studies concerned with the European space and European inte-
gration, their research agenda, and their critique to the mainstream European inte-
gration theories, what we could define European International Governmentality 
Studies.  
Foucault introduces the category of governmentality in the courses of 
1977-78 and 1978-79 at the Collège de France: Security, Territory, Population and The 
Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault 2008, 2009). In these two lectures on governmentality, 
 
2 This book introduced Foucault’s concept of governmentality in the English academic debate, even 
though the two Foucault’s lectures on governmentality were published only in 2004 and 2005 in 
France, and translated into English in 2008 and 2009. 
3 On this debate, see Kiersey & Weidner (2009) and Shani & Chandler (2010). 





Foucault connects his previous analysis on discursive formations (Foucault 1972) 
and disciplinary power (Foucault 1995) to a new set of problems: how power is ex-
ercised on population and how this power rationalises itself. In these lectures, Fou-
cault examines how a pluralisation of discourses is articulated in ‘a rational art of 
government’, first the liberal art of government, and then its ordoliberal and neolib-
eral rielaboration.  
Governing Europe by Walters and Haahr (2005) is the first book that system-
atically applied a governmentality approach to an analysis of European integration. 
For the two authors this means denaturalizing the idea of Europe, to expose the tel-
eological inspiration presented in many mainstream theories, and shows how strug-
gles about meanings, representations, and images of Europe have shaped the exist-
ing European Union. According to Walters and Haahr, governmentality as a form 
of political analysis explores mainly four issues: rationalities,4 forms of power, sub-
jectivity, and technologies.  
First, Governmentality Studies have a focus on the rationality of govern-
ment. These rationalities can be disclosed through looking at discursive formation, 
this means connecting discourse analysis to governmental practices, to analyse the 
materiality of discourses, and in this way avoiding the constructivist division be-
tween ideas and the material world. This has signified a special attention to policy 
papers, reports, legal texts, but also charts, graphs, and figures, rather than media or 
popular discourses, to search for what Walters, using Latour, calls the power of in-
scriptions (Walters 2002). This attention on the micro practices of governing shows 
how the European space has being created, assembled, and made visible. This has 
led many scholars to focus only on the micro-level of single programme or plan, but 
a governmentality analyses should be used also to examine the general art of gov-
ernment and its transformations. On this issue, Jessop argues that Foucault’s ap-
 
4 Walters and Haahr adopt the term mentality, but I think it is more appropriate to talk about ration-
ality, because mentality bears a reference to an individual mentality, rather than rationality clearly re-
fers to society. Merlingen defines rationality as: “a discursive formation, intimately linked to struc-
tures of power that produce effects of truth with regard to specific fields of governance” (2003, p. 
366). 
 






proach is scalable, in fact in the The Birth of Biopolitics Foucualt is mainly concerned 
with macro-institutional transformations rather than specific governmental practices 
(Jessop & Sum 2011, p. 63).  Furthermore, as Lemke (2000) ads it is necessary to 
reveal what does it happen between and after a programme or a reform plan, which 
resistances do they encounter and how they are really implemented.  
Second, governmentality refers to a specific form of power that emerges in 
the Sixteenth Century, but becomes fully developed only in the Eighteenth Century: 
the liberal art of government. A governmentality approach analyses the transfor-
mation of the liberal art of government, and its interconnection and separation with 
sovereignty and discipline. Governmentality Studies have first focused on how a 
certain neoliberal rationality has changed the way of governing at the national level, 
to, later, scale up the ‘government at a distance’ to the global level (Walters & 
Larner 2004). This has permitted, for example, to expose the narrative used by the 
European Commission on governance as a decision-making process in itself more 
horizontal, participatory and open to civil society (Shore 2011). But there are two 
set of problems in this process. First scaling up to a global level the ‘government at 
a distance’ assumes that the liberal art of government had a similar development 
every where, instead Foucault’s analysis is focused only on France and the Europe-
an space (Joseph 2009). Second, in process of scaling up there has been an under-
evaluation of what Dean (1999) calls ‘the illiberality of liberal government’, that is to 
say the contradiction at the centre of the liberal art of government between security 
apparatus and the production of freedom, a vector at the centre of liberalism. 
Hence, the liberal art of government does not simply enables and restrains the sub-
jects (Haahr 2004, p. 209), but it can also discipline and exclude (Opitz 2011).  
Third, governmentality as a form of political analysis reflects on the forms 
of subjectivities that the exercise of power produces. In fact, for Foucault, power 
does not simply repress individuals but it shapes their subjectivities.5 This is possible 
because Foucault views power as relational: “Power comes from below, that is, 
 
5 It is important to notice that a process of subjectivation is not only a passive process of ‘subjection’ 
but a process through which the subject constitutes itself (Kelly 2013, p. 513). 





there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the 
root of power relations” (Foucault 1978, p. 98). Here, the accent has been posed on 
the variety of subjectivities envisioned in the different European programmes and 
policies (Haahr & Walters 2005), but we believe that this emphasis on multiplicity 
needs to be correlated with an understanding of articulation. It is not sufficient to 
enumerate the different subjects that are envisioned in a reform – the self-
entrepreneur, the active-unemployed, the excluded – but we need to ask how this 
multiplicity is made to work as an ensemble and under which conditions connec-
tions between these different elements are created (Hall 1986, p. 53; Mezzadra & 
Nielson 2013, p. 194).6  
Fourth, governmentality as a form of political analysis investigates tech-
nologies. The emphasis is on ‘How’ of governing instead of the ‘Why’.7 How is the 
European space made and remade? How is European identity constructed? 
Through which governmental actions, programmes, and tools? How did something 
like the European Union come into existence? By which technologies and vocabu-
laries is authority constituted and rule accomplished? (Dean 1999, p. 31). This has 
meant an attention to technologies of power – the tools through which power is ex-
ercised. Technologies are defined in a very broad sense, Walters (2004, p. 161-162) 
suggests three levels of understanding technologies when applied to the study of 
European governance. The first level is the micro level, where we can find charts, 
scoreboards, timetables, benchmarks, evaluations – all of which make Europe visi-
ble and calculable. The second level of understanding is the machine, and it is the one 
on which we will draw upon. Machines are relatively durable arrangements of re-
 
6 This implies the recognition of multiple actors, discourses, and regimes in conflict with themselves 
over the exercise of power, which does not mean that the exercise of power becomes impossible, but 
it is contested. “From this point of view, an emphasis on the heterogeneity of discipline and biopoli-
tics as technologies of power cannot but go along with and attempt to grasp the unitary moment and 
rationality of their articulation” (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013, p. 194). In this perspective, a multiplicity 
of practices, different forms of power, and the coexistence of different rationalities need to be 
thought together with their articulation and hierarchisation.  
7 The evasion of any ‘Why’ question is an intrinsic limit of any governmentality approach. I believe it 
is actually interesting to relocate Foucauldian-inspired Governmentality Studies in the broader socio-
economic context, whilst avoiding a universalising and totalising understanding of capitalism (Bilan-
cetti 2019).  






gimes of knowledge and practices that constitute subjects and objects over which 
power is exercised. Europe could be considered as an interconnection of different 
machines, able to work on different spaces and levels at the same time, a series of 
European technological zones (Barry 2001, p. 68).8 The third level of understanding 
is viewing the European Union itself as a site where new technologies are created – 
a space of political creation – such as harmonisation or European citizenship.  
Therefore, we will apply governmentality avoiding only a focus on the mi-
cro-level, without erasing the illiberality of the liberal art of government, taking into 
consideration articulation, and referring to the second level of technology, the ma-
chine.   
 
 
3. The ordo/neoliberal art of government in the European Union  
Applying a governmentality approach permits us to reposition European 
governance as a reformulation of the liberal art of government whilst exposing its 
techniques of government.  
In the economic realm of the European Union, the prevailing discursive 
formation is based on the interconnection between ordoliberal and neoliberal ideas. 
For Foucault, ordoliberalism is based on: market as a foundational principle for the 
state, the active role of government to establish free competition, and a society 
ruled in the name of competition. For this author, the main difference with Hay-
ekian and American neoliberalism is the role of government. For ordoliberals, gov-
ernment should play a role in the market, setting and safeguarding a particular ‘or-
 
8 The machine is a Deleuzian category developed in his reflections around war. Despite drawing on 
the Foucauldian reading of Clausewitz, Deleuze will develop a different reading of the relation be-
tween war and modern power, stating that the war machine is external from the state, which is only 
able to appropriate this machine for its use (Reid 2003). Walters, inspired by both Foucualt and 
Deleuze, analysing the first two decades of European integration talks about the planning machine 
configured in the French state and the social-market machine configured in the German state, both 
at play in the construction of the European Community. “It is a case of how these machines come to 
provide the conditions of possibility by which a series of decision-making centres, whether located 
formally within the EU or within national governments, can both see and act on ‘Europe’” (Walters 
2004, p. 168).  





der’, whereas for neoliberals it should not (Foucault 2008, p. 79-100). Furthermore, 
for Foucault, neoliberals conceive all human behaviour in economic–rational terms, 
envisaging redefining society as a form of the economic domain (Foucualt 2008, p. 
216-238).  
These two reformulations of the classical liberal art of government have 
both shaped the European institutions. In fact, the European Union has evolved 
differently from other free trade zones (e.g., NAFTA or ASEAN) merging neolib-
eral ideas of free market and abolition of tariffs with a rigid institutional architec-
ture. Hence, the European Union has not only developed a single market but also a 
European Monetary Union (EMU) governed by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), fostering an idea of Europe as a competitive economic space, based on the 
fiscal responsibility of Member states and the construction of entrepreneurial socie-
ties.  
The borders of this ordo/neoliberal discursive formation that shape the 
European economic space are continuously blurred by struggles and the emergence 
of new practices. But at the same time, the capacity to deal with these conflicts cre-
ates a certain stability. This ordo/neoliberal discourse needs to “be seen as an-
chored in (and helping to anchor) specific social practices, organisational routines, 
and institutions and/or as partly constitutive of specific social identities in the wider 
society” (Jessop 2014, p. 355). This means that when the ordo/neoliberal discursive 
formation emerged, other discourses became less effective – as the one on Social 
Europe. Hence, this ordo/neoliberal discursive formation is not a unity, but instead 
of looking only at its multiple forms, we should look for its moments of stabilisa-
tion and crystallisation, that is to say the formation of a system of powers. At the 
same time, we should look for disjunctions, contradictions, and inconsistencies in 
this system, for the purpose of deconstructing and transforming it (Foucault 1978, 
p. 92).  
In this ordo/neoliberal art of government, Member States are not passive 
actors but they are active in shaping this discursive formation at the European level, 
and active in its promotion at the national level. Hence, States are not simply actor 






on which governmentality acts upon (Fougner 2008), but they actively contribute to 
delineate the ordo/neoliberal discourse, or strategies to change it.  However, the 
ability of a state to shape this discursive formation is based on global hierarchies 
structured around economic development, military force, and colonial heritage. 
Furthermore, this neoliberal discursive formation is not only shaped by 
Member states, but by struggles between civil, economic and political actors that 
continuously take place at the domestic, national and international level. Similarly to 
what we have said for Member states, not all actors are able to shape discourses and 
practices in the same way or to the same extent, and these struggles over meanings 
and practices are continuously blurring the borders of this ordo/neoliberal discur-
sive formation. In fact, the ordo/neoliberal art of government functions in different 
ways, and with different outcomes, when applied to different countries and regions 
of the European space.  
This ordo/neoliberal art of government takes the form of a government at 
a distance, through governmental, disciplinary and biopolitical techniques. Gov-
ernmental techniques are all those techniques that foster the responsibilisation of 
Member States, of their civil societies and their populations, such as the techniques 
envisioned in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) (Haahr 2004). Disciplinary 
techniques are all those that monitor, measure and control subjects over whom 
power is exercised, these include all the techniques of visibility, as the ones used in 
the NEG reforms (Walter 2002). Biopolitical techniques are all those which aim to 
conduct the conduct of populations as a whole, in the European Union these in-
clude all the techniques used to regulate migration, in what has been defined the 
‘border regime’ (Walters 2006, 2010). 
It is evident how during the crisis we have seen a reinforcement of the dis-
ciplinary apparatus: the Six Pack, the Two Pack, the TSCG and the European Se-
mester have all envisaged new mechanisms to monitor, control and sanction Mem-
ber states. The NEG reforms have the aim to reinforce the apparatus of surveil-
lance of the SGP preventive arm and the disciplinary power of the SGP corrective 





arm. This is what has been defined an authoritarian turn of the European govern-
ance (Bruff 2014; Oberndorfer 2014; Menéndez 2016).  
Hence we think governmentality can help us to: first, to not look at states 
as monolithic actors, but as spaces where a continuous reshaping of practices, dis-
courses, and institutions takes place, and become organised and re-organised in an 
art of government. This art of government is not defined only at the national or lo-
cal level, but also at the European and global level. It is around this continuous re-
shaping that struggles take place, new practices try to emerge, and counter-conducts 
take different directions. Second, to analyse power as relational. This means that any 
relation of power entails a resistance to it. But at the same time, we need to 
acknowledge that not all relations of power are equal, and these differences form 
the differential possibility of resistances emerging, and contributing to shape new 
discursive formations. This differentiation is not always clear in Foucault’s writings, 
as well as in many subsequent studies on governmentality. Third, to grasp the mu-
tual constitution of power and knowledge, between processes of subjectivation and 
the exercise of power. However, this mutual constitution is not always linear, and 
not all knowledge (savoirs) are able to shape power in the same equal way.  
 
 
4. The New Economic Governance: a reinforcement of the Fiscal Govern-
ance Machine 
This ordo/neoliberal discourse has been challenged during the crisis, and 
its framework has been renegotiated, and at the end it has been reaffirmed and rein-
forced through the New Economic Governance (NEG). Instead of looking at the 
supposed intrinsic economic logic of these reforms, or instead of demonstrating 
their non-adherence to a certain economic logic, we want to look at the context of 
their emergence, and at “the strategies in which they take effect, whose general de-
sign or institutional crystallisation is embodied in the state apparatus” (Foucault 
1978, p. 92).  






During the crisis, intergovernmental readings have flourished, highlighting 
the new centrality of the European Council, and in this forum, the renovated ability 
of the German government to led negotiation process (Puetter 2012; Schimmelfen-
nig 2015; da Conceicao-Heldt 2016). Even though this renovated German ability is 
undeniable, as we can see in the process which led to the signature of the Treaty on 
Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG), many reforms included in the 
NEG empower the European Commission with a new role of surveillance and 
guidance of national economic, fiscal, and social policies  (Bauer & Becker 2014; 
2016).  
From our perspective, the ensemble of reforms part of the NEG reinforc-
es what we call a ‘fiscal governance machine’ set up with the SGP and implemented 
in all the Member states. This reinforcement has meant a turn towards the applica-
tion of more disciplinary technologies able to scrutinise, monitor, and make visible. 
By ‘fiscal governance machine’ we point out an ensemble of different institutional 
devices, organised on different scales and levels, that share the same apparatus of 
knowledge and power based on a competitive economy, fiscal stability, entrepre-
neurial society and individualized responsibility, that have the aim of steering the 
political economy of Member States.  
Conceiving fiscal stability as a machine of governance means to take into 
account a range of interacting socio-technical entities among which we can list: ne-
oliberal think thank, international economic organisations, fiscal agency, public au-
thorities, fiscal and economic ministries, universities, statistical offices, independent 
bodies, computer models, forecasts and algorithms. Such an account looks how fis-
cal stability has become the main objective of European and national institutions 
(Bousquet 2014). As we have explained in the previous section, this is not the sole 
machine at work in the European space, and instead of conceiving the European 
Union in terms of political bargains between states (Walters 2004), we could think 
at the European Union as an assemblage of different governance machines in con-
flict with each other (Acuto & Curtis 2014).  





The Six Pack, the Two Pack and the TSCG contain measures regarding 
the fiscal and economic governance of the Union, co-ordinated by the cycle of the 
European Semester (Verdun & Zeitlin 2018, p. 138). The principle aims of these re-
forms is well surmised by the third article of the TSCG, where we read: ‘the budget-
ary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or 
in surplus’ (art 3.1a). Since the European institutions have considered excessive def-
icit and debt the main problem to main cause of the financial crisis, how to enforce 
effectively the balanced budget rule in all Member states and their sub-state actors is 
the central question beyond these reforms.  
For question of space, in this article we examine in depth only three tech-
niques envisioned in the NEG: the Structural Deficit, the Fiscal Advisory Council, 
and the Automatic Correction Mechanism. These techniques highlight three exem-
plar features of the NEG: a new discretionary power of the European Commission, 
the automatisation or semi-automatisation of rules, and independence of the rele-
vant national agency from state institutions, at the basis of the reinforcement of the 
fiscal governance machine.  
 
3.1. The Structural Deficit 
Since its approval, the SGP has triggered a debate around the relation be-
tween fiscal stability, that for the pact is expressed in the 3% threshold, and eco-
nomic growth. After the conflict between the European Commission and the 
Council on the French and German Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP),9 in 2005, a 
reform of the Pact clarified the procedure for Excessive Deficit. The nominal ceil-
ing of the 3% was replaced, and the structural deficit was introduced (Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 1056/2005).   
 
9 In 2003, a procedure for Excessive Deficit was open against France and Germany. Even though 
the two countries did not comply with the path set up by the Commission’s programme, the Council 
did not approve the sanctions proposed by the Commission. For this reason, the Commission 
brought the Council before the European Court of Justice for exceeding its authority, and the Court 
ruled against the Council. 






Today, Member states are expected to respect the Medium Term Objec-
tive (MTO), or to be heading towards it by adjusting their structural budgetary posi-
tion at a rate of 0.5% of GDP per year as a benchmark.10 The MTO is calculated in 
structural terms, therefore taking into consideration business cycle swings and filter-
ing out temporary measures. The structural deficit is considered by European insti-
tutions a better way to calculate the deficit than nominal values, because it is more 
flexible and able to take into consideration the economic cycle (Wyplosz 2013). This 
calculation is presented as a technical question of statistics, without any political im-
plications. But who and how can decide which measures should be filter out as 
temporary and which should be considered structural?  
The structural deficit is the difference between present and potential out-
put. The potential output is not observable but is an estimation based on the eco-
nomic capacity of a country. There are different models to calculate the potential 
output, and the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD do not apply the 
same one. And this means that they produce different forecasts.11 This estimation is 
based on different economic assumptions, subjected to significant errors and revi-
sions, and it end up being highly contested in the economic discipline (Gros & Al-
cidi 2014; Radice 2014; Heimberger et al. 2017). In 2013, after that the Spanish 
Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU)12 forecast was equal to 
the real rate of unemployment, the DG Finance had to revise its model of calcula-
tion (Havik et al., 2014; Gechert et al. 2016). Hereafter, different Member states 
have challenged this calculation, and in 2015, the European Commission had to re-
 
10 Art. 3.1d of the TSCG stays that where the ratio of the general government debt to gross domestic 
product is significantly below 60% the lower limit of the MTO can reach a structural deficit of 1,0 
%. 
11 In 2016, for example, the output gap for the euro area was estimated 1.0 by the European Com-
mission autumn forecast, 1.2 by the IMF October outlook, and 1.9 by the OECD November eco-
nomic outlook.   
12 The Commission calculates the potential output as an outcome of human capital, investments and 
productivity. Hence, it considers production a function of trend capital, labour and total factor 
productivity. The labour component is calculated on the basis of NAWRU that indicates the level of 
unemployment below which wages are supposed to rise (Mourre et al. 2013). 





lease a communication on the use of flexibility in the SGP.13 On the basis of this 
communication, during the Covid-19 crisis the SGP has been suspended, and the 
general escape clause has been activated (Commission Communication (EU) No 
123/2020).  
Here, it lays a new power of calculation assigned to the DG Finance, 
which is the European institution responsible for this and other measurements. In 
fact, during the European Semester, the DG Finance is continuously collecting data 
and information on Member states to make them legible and visible, through what 
has been called an “information-driven surveillance process” (Savage & Howarth 
2018, p. 212). For implementing the reinforced SGP preventive arm, an entire appa-
ratus of knowledge and power has been elaborated based on supposedly-objective 
economic experts and statistical agencies with the aim to monitor and control dif-
ferent institutional actors. This has turned to be the way through which depoliticise 
the public debate on economic and fiscal issues, asserting the necessity of fiscal sta-
bility as the only valuable alternative. Thanks to this power of calculation, the Euro-
pean Commission, and its DG Finance in particular, has gained a discretional power 
on how to calculate and what to make visible, governing the relation between eco-
nomic forecasts and economic governance. And even though the SGP at the mo-
ment is suspended, this capacity of measurement and control it is still active, and it 
will be deployed to control the implementation of the Recovery Fund by the Mem-
ber states.  
 
3.2. The Fiscal Advisory Council  
For years the IMF, the OECD, the ECB and the European Commission 
have advocated for independent agencies controlling national budget. In 2006, the 
European Commission launched a survey about the institutionalisation of Fiscal 
Council, at that time only the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium had a national 
 
13 In 2015, the Italian economic Minister Padoan has criticised the NAWRU calculation in the Draft 
Budgetary Plan. Following this open contestation, the European Commission has released a Com-
munication on making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (Commission Communication (EU) No 12/2015). 






independent Fiscal Council. The crisis has opened the momentum to achieve their 
institutionalisation. The Six Pack was the first NEG reform to foster the introduc-
tion of Fiscal Councils in all Member states. Then, the TSCG affirmed in its third 
article that an independent supervisory institution should monitor the actions of the 
Member states. Finally, the Two Pack has restated this necessity. Today all the Eu-
ropean Member states have set up Fiscal Councils, but following different institu-
tional models (Tesche 2019).  
The Two Pack envisages mainly two tasks for the Fiscal Council: first, 
monitoring compliance with fiscal rules, and second, producing or evaluating mac-
ro-economic forecasts (art. 5 Council Regulation (EU) No 473/2013). Fiscal Coun-
cil shall be an independent body, from a structural point of view against any nation-
al economic or fiscal authority, and from a functional point of view, operating with 
its own budget and regulation (art. 2 Council Regulation (EU) No 473/2013). Final-
ly, Fiscal Council shall be composed by economic experts rather than politicians, 
and it shall have access to all economic data and information of the Member state.  
The creation of independent Fiscal Councils to monitor fiscal policies is 
part of a larger ‘agencification’ process, which outsources regulatory power to inde-
pendent agencies and bodies centred on the role of experts (Jordana et al. 2011). In 
this way, issues considered technical are subtracted from public debate and regula-
tions are separated from policy making (Majone 1994). European and national 
agencies have proliferated in the last twenty years, representing a significant change 
in the organization of the state apparatuses (Andoura & Timmerman 2008). Today, 
there are 44 decentralised agencies in the European Union, coordinated by the EU 
Agencies Network. The Commission describes ‘agencification’ process as a matura-
tion of the EU system and as a strategy to enhance credibility, efficiency and trans-
parency (Commission Communication (EC) No 718/2002).  
Creating national Fiscal Councils, the European Commission had the in-
tent to, first, depoliticise certain dimensions of fiscal policy, similarly to what hap-
pened for monetary policy (Debrun & Kinda 2014, p. 4). Second, to improve com-
pliance with the fiscal rules controlling Member states from the inside, but without 





creating competing competences between the European and the national level 
(Tesche 2019, p. 3). For this reason, in 2015, it was set up the European Network 
of Independent Fiscal Institutions (EU IFISI), and, some months later, the Europe-
an Fiscal Board (EFB), an independent advisory body with a consultative role to-
wards the Commission (Commission Decision (EU) No 221/2016). Thus, at the 
centre of this decentralised network of fiscal advisory councils, we find, again, the 
European Commission and its DG finance.  
The aim of this decentralised network of Fiscal Councils is to enhance 
compliance with the ordo/neolibearal rationality, and not to improve the democrat-
ic legitimation of the new Euro-national procedures (Fasone & Fromage 2016). It 
fosters a process of surveillance on the political economy of Member states, adding 
to the top-down dimension of control, an horizontal dimension of control organ-
ised directly at the national level, what Sánchez-Cuenca (2017) defines a ‘technocrat-
ic federalism in fiscal policy’.  
3.3. The Correction Mechanism  
If the introduction of Fiscal Councils added a horizontal dimension of 
control, the idea of an automatic Correction Mechanism goes beyond the simple 
surveillance on Member states towards direct control. This Correction Mechanism 
was introduced, in the first place, in the third article of the TSCG where we read 
that in the event of significant deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path 
towards it, a correction mechanism has to be triggered automatically. Later, this has 
been inserted in the European legal framework through the Two Pack.  
The common principles of the Correction Mechanism are set in a com-
munication of the European Commission (Commission Communication (EU) No 
342/2012). The activation of the Correction Mechanism shall occur in well-defined 
circumstances characterising a significant deviation (principle 3), and the size and 
timeline of the correction shall be framed by pre-determined rules (principle 4). The 
automatic mechanism shall correct the situation through the implementation of 
counter measures. These counter measure have to restore the structural balance at 
or above the MTO within a planned deadline, and they should give a prominent op-






erational role to rules on public expenditure and discretionary tax measures (princi-
ple 5). Hence, Member states are required to adopt a corrective plan that has to be 
binding over the budgets covered by the correction period, with rules decided ex-
ante and not specific to the circumstances. Once this mechanism is adopted, it 
should be controlled not only by national government, but by an independent body.  
The automatic Correction Mechanism can be read as a form of decentral-
ized and peer surveillance, where a move beyond the government at a distance is 
taking place towards a direct intervention into state institutions. Similarly to the ra-
tionale beyond the corrective mechanism, the idea is to move from a top-down di-
mension of control towards a decentralized system of control, that in the end refers 
to the DG Finance of the European Commission.  
These three techniques reveal important features of the NEG: a new and 
reinforced discretional power of the European Commission, the enhanced role of 
its DG finance, the relation between economic forecasts and economic governance, 
a decentralised form control on national institutions, and the emergence of a Euro-
national system of interconnected institutions. This express not only the reaffirma-
tion of the fiscal governance machine but its reinforcement deploying new discipli-
nary techniques, exacerbating the illiberality at the heart of the ordo/neoliberal art 
of government. In fact, this reinforcement has accelerated the crisis of parliamen-
tary democracy, giving prominence to the economic and executive institutions both 
at the national and European level.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this article we engaged critically with the International Governmentality 
Studies on the European Union to analyse the NEG. Following this perspective, we 
have defined the European Union as an ensemble of machines, sometimes in con-
flicts between each other, kept together by the continuous reshaping of an or-
do/neoliberal discourse that defines the language and objectives of its Member 
States.  





Going beyond a simple emphasis on multiplicity, and the micro level we 
have focused our analysis on the reaffirmation of the fiscal governance machine af-
ter the economic crisis of 2008. This fiscal governance machine, set up with the 
SGP, has been reinforced with the NEG. We have showed this shifting examining 
three techniques envisaged in the NEG reforms: the structural deficit, the Fiscal 
Council, and the Correction Mechanism. Here, we have highlighted how a new dis-
cretional power of the European Commission and of its DG Finance is emerging, 
as much as a new decentralised and semi-automatic form of control. At the end, we 
have pointed out how the organisation of this governance machine is creating new 
connections between economic and fiscal institutions at the national and European 
level, consolidating a Euro-national space dominated by an ordo/neoliberal ration-
ality. Hence, the conflicts we see between national economic ministries and the Eu-
ropean Commission are just part of this art of government which governs through 
institutional competition. Therefore, to transform this art of government is neces-
sary to challenge the ordo/neoliberal rationality, not simply the institutional level of 
its decision-making. So even if during the Covid pandemic the SGP has been sus-
pended, this ordo/neoliberal rationality has not been challenged yet. For this reason 
the Recovery Fund implementation risks to be another reaffirmation of the same 
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